



An agenda-setting model of electoral competition
Josep M. Colomer · Humberto Llavador
Received: 2 October 2010 / Accepted: 23 March 2011 / Published online: 6 April 2011
© The Author(s) 2011. This article is published with open access at SpringerLink.com
Abstract This paper presents a model of electoral competition focusing on the for-
mation of the public agenda. An incumbent government and a challenger party in
opposition compete in elections by choosing the issues that will key out their cam-
paigns. Giving salience to an issue implies proposing an innovative policy proposal,
alternative to the status-quo. Parties trade off the issues with high salience in voters’
concerns and those with broad agreement on some alternative policy proposal. Each
party expects a higher probability of victory if the issue it chooses becomes salient
in the voters’ decision. But remarkably, the issues which are considered the most
important ones by a majority of voters may not be given salience during the electoral
campaign. An incumbent government may survive in spite of its bad policy perfor-
mance if there is no sufficiently broad agreement on a policy alternative. We illustrate
the analytical potential of the model with the case of the United States presidential
election in 2004.
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1 Introduction
On the occasion of the United States presidential election in 2004, former president
Bill Clinton, who was not running as candidate, stated: “Generally, the presidential
elections in the United States turn always around three questions. First: how onewould
feel at having that person as president?. . . As second element there is the candidate’s
position on certain issues. The third factor is the following:What is this election about?
Is it about the United States having a multilateral attitude in foreign policy? Or is it
whether taxes should be lowered for the rich or more should be done for the poor?”
In this paperwe focus on the third factor:what elections are about. Just tomention an
illustration of the relevance of the selection of issues during the electoral campaign, let
us also quote somebody involved in theNovember 4th, 2008U.S. presidential election.
This was published at the beginning of September, just after the two party conven-
tions, when the survey polls showed a close tie between the two main candidates:
“’If in October we’re talking about Russia and national defense and who can manage
America in a difficult world, John McCain will be president’, predict[ed] Thomas
Rath, the leading Republican strategist in the swing state of New Hampshire. ‘If we’re
talking largely about domestic issues and health care, Barack Obama probably will
be president’. Events can affect that conversation. If Russia invades another country
on Oct. 20 or Iran detonates a nuclear weapon, advantage McCain; if there’s another
Bear Stearns meltdown, or a stock market crash, put a few points on the Obama side.”
(Albert R. Hunt, ‘Letter from Washington’, New York Times, 8 Sep 2008). Indeed,
1 month later, during the third Presidential Debate in October 15th, Barak Obama
pointed out that “Senator McCain’s own campaign said publicly last week that, if we
keep on talking about the economic crisis, we lose, so we need to change the subject.”
This paper discusses the criteria for party choices of issues and the subsequent cam-
paign outcomes. We present a formal model of electoral competition focusing on the
formation of the public agenda, in which two political parties or candidates compete
to win an election by choosing an issue and a policy position on that issue to which
they try to give political salience. Giving salience to an issue implies proposing an
innovative policy proposal on the issue as an alternative to the status-quo policy, as
well as talking about it, usually with a value or argument, and making it news with
some effort investment in order to making it relevant for voters’ electoral decisions.
A party will choose a priority issue to campaign for if it is a likely winning issue,
that is, if it has a likely winning position and it is likely to become decisive in the
election. Whether an issue will become a winning issue depends on two variables: (i)
the ex-ante ‘pre-campaign or social salience’ of the issue in voters’ concerns and (i i)
the voters’ support or ‘agreement’ in favor of an alternative policy proposal on the
issue.
Thus, parties have to trade off the two variables. If one issue is highly salient in the
voters’ concerns, but voters are highly divided about which one of the possible policy
alternatives to the status-quo is better, choosing to campaign on the issue by holding
one of the policy alternatives may be risky. If, on the contrary, there is broad social
agreement about the best policy alternative to the status-quo on one issue, but the issue
is not a priority for voters’ electoral decision, running on that issue can attract little
attention. Hence, whether parties compete by raising the same issue and proposing two
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different policy alternatives on it or by choosing different issues does not depend only
on voters’ priority concerns, but also on each party’s likelihood to hold potentially
winning policy positions. It is always possible that the issues which are considered the
most important ones by a majority of voters be not given political salience by parties
during the electoral campaign.
This may be a surprising result, but it may be a reasonable one after all. Important
issues in people’s concerns can, thus, be solved through electoral competition only
when a policy alternative appears as clearly superior to voters’ eyes. In the absence
of a majority agreement on a best policy alternative, parties can choose not to give
salience to the issue, thus maintaining the status-quo policy even if it is unsatisfactory
for voters. As a more worrisome consequence, mediocre policies broadly rejected by
the electorate, as well as incumbent parties with no good performance in government,
may survive.
Foundational works about the importance of agenda-setting in competitive elec-
tions include the well-known contributions by Stokes (1963) and Petrocik (1996).
They depart in important aspects from the standard ‘spatial theory’ of electoral com-
petition, in which parties or candidates compete by choosing policy ‘positions’ on a
space which is basically given. There are also a number of collections and analysis
of empirical data on issues in electoral platforms (including Riker 1993; Budge 1993;
Budge et al. 2001; Petrocik et al. 2003; Klingemann et al. 2006; see the critical review
of the literature by Colomer and Puglisi 2005); Baumgartner and Jones (2009) and
http://www.policyagendas.org develop and encompassing project on policy agendas
including broad empirical material potentially to be analyzed with the framework
presented in this article.
However, not a formal model has been elaborated, to our knowledge, which spec-
ifies the structural and strategic conditions in which political parties or candidates
choose issues in the electoral campaign and shape the relevant policy space.1 We dis-
cuss these conditions and analyze the type of issues—as defined for their salience in
voters’ concerns and the acceptation of policy proposals on them—which should be
expected to be chosen in equilibrium.
The plan for the rest of the paper is the following. In Sect. 2 we present a spa-
tial model of agenda formation in which parties compete on one issue at a time. For
each issue there is some probability of victory for the party holding the most popu-
lar policy alternative. We introduce the concepts of issue salience and the degree of
agreement on the policy alternative to the status-quo. Section 3 describes issues in
the salience-agreement space, and Sect. 4 presents the equilibrium results. Section 5
provides several examples showing that parties can compete on issues with either high
salience or broad agreement or both. They do not compete on issues with both low
salience among voters and low agreement on the best policy alternative. However,
parties may choose not to campaign on those issues with highest salience in voters’
concerns, thus postponing solutions to unpopular status-quo policies with consider-
able social discontent. In Sect. 6, as an illustration, we discuss the choice of campaign
1 Amorós and Puy (2007, 2010) present a complementary study to our analysis. While the present paper
focuses on the selection of issues, in their papers the salient issues are given and they study the allocation
of resources to change the saliency in voters’ preferences.
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issues for the 2004 United States presidential election in the light of the findings in
the model. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Consider an incumbent party in government (G) and a challenger party in opposition
(O) that compete to win an election by choosing an issue and a policy position on that
issue. There are N potential issues, and for each issue i = 1, . . . , N , there exists a
status-quo policy (qi ) and two innovative policy proposals located on different sides
of qi , which can be called xi and yi respectively. If the issue is, for example, taxes,
one of the alternatives implies higher taxes, and the other lower taxes, than the sta-
tus-quo, and similarly for any other issue, so that the two alternatives are on different
sides of the status-quo. That is, either xi < qi < yi or yi < qi < xi . Denote by
Ai = {xi , qi , yi } the set alternatives on issue i .2
2.1 Electorate
Voters have convex preferences over the feasible set of policy alternatives and we
assume sincere voting on each issue. For an issue i , let Fi (ai , a′i ) be the fraction of
citizens who prefer alternative ai to a′i , implied by their induced preferences once
keeping all other issues constant at the status-quo. Denote by F xi = Fi (xi , qi ) and by
F yi = Fi (yi , qi ) the support for each one of the alternatives against the status-quo.
For simplicity, assume that F xi = F yi and re-label the alternatives to the status-quo so
that xi represents the one with the highest support, F xi > F
y
i .
The assumption that innovative policy proposals are on different sides of the status-
quo implies, by the convexity of preferences, that voters who favor alternative ai prefer
the status-quo to the other alternative a′i . Formally, preferences satisfy that, fixing the
policy on all other issues, if xi  qi then qi  yi . And similarly, if yi  qi , then
qi  xi .3 Intuitively, this means, for example, that voters who would like lower taxes
would vote against a tax increase by supporting the status-quo.
2.2 The probability of winning on an issue
The winning alternative on a particular issue i is the one receiving a majority of votes.
Following the literature on electoral uncertainty (Wittman 1983), we assume that
parties face uncertainty on the outcome of the election, and no alternative wins with
2 A minimum of three alternatives, with at least one position on each side of the status-quo for each issue,
are necessary to obtain a surviving status-quo because of a divided electorate on the best alternative. Nev-
ertheless, the main results from this three-alternative model would continue to hold in a framework where
each issue admits a finite number of distinct positions. Therefore, we side with Krasa and Polborn (2010) in
arguing that “a setup with very few feasible positions on each issue is actually a quite realistic description
of political campaigns” (p. 2).
3 For the present analysis we only require that the previous conditions on induced preferences hold when
all other issues are fixed at the status-quo. Hence, convexity of preferences is a stronger assumption than
needed.
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probability one. For simplicity, we postulate a generic probability of victory function
satisfying a very undemanding condition.4
Definition 1 Let πi : Ai × Ai → (0, 1) be the probability of victory on issue i
function, with πi (ai , a′i ) representing the probability of victory of ai against a′i .
Assume that, for each alternative policy, the probability of defeating the status-
quo is increasing in the fraction of supporters for that alternative. Formally, denote
by π xi = πi (xi , qi ) and π yi = πi (yi , qi ) the probabilities that alternatives xi and yi
defeat the status-quo on issue i . Then, π xi = ϕi (Fxi ) and π yi = ϕi (Fyi ), with ϕ′ > 0. In
particular, we do not make any assumption on πi (xi , yi ), and hence there is no need
to specify how voters favoring qi would split if they had to choose between the two
alternatives xi and yi . For simplicity we fix ϕi (1/2) = 1/2.5
Because Fxi > F
y




i , that is x is the advantaged alternative
on issue i . Without loss of generality, we can sort the issues i = 1, . . . , N according
to the probability of victory of the advantaged alternative. We assume for simplicity a
strict ordering:
π x1 > π
x
2 > · · · > π xN−1 > π xN . (1)
Suppose that one party has proposed alternative ai ∈ Ai on issue i . Given the
sequential play analyzed in this paper, we will assume that the other party cannot win
by proposing exactly the same alternative on the same issue. Formally, πi (ai , ai ) = 0
for the last party proposing alternative ai . That is, given that voters know that one
party has announced the policy reform ai (and in a sense that party has acquired the
“ownership” of that position), the other party must defend a different position if it
wants to compete on that same issue and still hold a positive probability of winning.
Combined with the idea that the status-quo belongs to the government, this condition
implies that the opposition party cannot defeat an incumbent government on an issue
by defending the status-quo, unless the government has proposed first an alternative
policy.
2.3 Issue salience and level of agreement on the policy alternative
Each issue is characterized by some social or pre-campaign salience, which reflects
voters’ concerns, and by some agreement on the best policy alternative. Pre-campaign
salience and policy agreement are both derived from voters’ preferences.
The preferences of voters regarding which issues should be more important in the
election canbe formed throughpersonal experiences,media emphases, interest groups’
promotions or uncontrolled events. But it seems logical that the degree of salience in
4 See Chapter 2 in Roemer (2001) for several models of electoral uncertainty which derive a probability of
victory function consistent with our setting.
5 None of the qualitative results hinges on this assumption that we make to simplify the exposition.
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voters’ perception should be related to the degree of social discontent with the status-
quo policy on the issue.6 In this sense, we measure the salience of issue i in an inverse
relation to the support or consensus with the status-quo policy. High-salience implies
that a large group of voters (Fxi + Fyi ) disagree on the prevailing status-quo on the
issue.
Definition 2 Define the (pre-campaign) salience of issue i as σi = Fxi + Fyi .
However, social discontent with the status-quo, and hence high salience, does not
necessarily imply a broad agreement on the best policy alternative. It may be, on the
contrary, that voters are highly divided on which alternative would be better than the
status-quo.Wemeasure the level of agreement as the share of discontented voters who





this measure to range from 0 to 1, we obtain7






Therefore, the maximum value of ζi is 1, when there is total agreement on the
best alternative to the status-quo (i.e. Fyi = 0), and the minimum value of ζi is 0,
when the discontented electorate is evenly split between the alternatives xi and yi (i.e.
Fxi = Fyi = 1/2).
2.4 Post-campaign or political salience
In order to make an issue decisive in the election, parties try to make it ‘salient’ in
voters’ decision by giving it political salience. Parties confer political salience by
campaigning on the issue and proposing a policy alternative to the status-quo. Let us
call the political salience or post-campaign salience of issue k the probability that k
becomes the decisive issue once parties have campaigned on issues i and j .
Definition 4 Define the post-campaign salience or political salience of issue k when
parties have politicized issues i and j, si j (k), as the probability that issue k becomes
the decisive issue.
We impose the following assumptions on the measure of political salience. First,
parties can give political salience to an issue only by proposing a policy alternative to
the status-quo. This implies that issues not raised in the electoral campaign do not get
6 It might be the case the status-quo was in the past a widely accepted policy with some degree of sup-
port. However, it may have become “socially inefficient” or discredited. This can be due to a much higher
salience of the issue due to some unforeseen event, technological innovations, voters’ new preferences as
a consequence of new policies on other issues, or changes in people values. Examples of old status-quo
policies that have lost wide support and have become vulnerable to new challenges may include financial
regulations, environmental issues, defense spending, communication monopolies, and many others.




i + Fyi ) such that ζi (0) = 0 and ζi (1/2) = 1.
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salience and hence cannot be decisive. Secondly, if both parties decide to campaign
on the same issue, then it becomes the decisive issue since it is the only issue raised
during the electoral campaign. Finally, if parties give political salience to two different
issues, the probability for each issue to become decisive equals its relative salience.
Assumption 1 Given a pair of issues, i, j , chosen by the government and the oppo-
sition parties:
1. si j (k) = 0 for all k /∈ {i, j},
2. sii (i) = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , N ,
3. si j (i) = σiσi +σ j for all i = j .
It follows that for any pair of different issues, si j (i) = 1 − si j ( j). We will write
si j = si j (i) whenever there is no ambiguity.
2.5 The expected probability of electoral victory
Parties want to win the election. Observe that parties face uncertainty on the identity
of the decisive issue as well as on the winning position on each issue. The probability
of electoral victory equals the probability of winning with an issue times the prob-
ability that the issue will be decisive in the election. When parties compete on the
same issue, this issue becomes decisive and their probability of victory coincides with
their probability of holding the winning policy position on that issue. When parties
campaign on different issues, the probability of victory is the expected probability of
holding the winning policy position on the decisive issue.
Definition 5 Define the expected probability of victory  for a party proposing alter-







πi (ai , a′j ), if j = i
si j πi (ai , qi ) + (1 − si j ) (1 − π j (a′j , q j )), if i = j
. (2)
Remember that this definition presumes that voters associate to the status quo the
position of a party not proposing a policy alternative on an issue.
2.6 Timing and equilibrium
The political game consists of choosing policy issues and alternatives to compete
on for the next election. It develops sequentially, following some order of play (See
Fig. 1.). We give the incumbent government the first-mover advantage, capturing that
governments can act while opposition parties can only make promises. Nevertheless,
the order of play is not relevant for our results since it does not affect the set of issues
chosen, but who chooses them, a feature we do not exploit. Hence, first we let the gov-
ernment party choose either towait for the opposition tomake amove (w) or to take the
initiative (nw). Taking the initiativemeans that the government party chooses one issue
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ijs πi (1 ijs )+ − (1−
a'π  )j
b'
kcs πk (1 kcs )+ − (1−
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Fig. 1 Game tree. The final nodes represent the issues with political salience and the expected probability
of victory for the incumbent government G
i on which it proposes a policy alternative to the status-quo ai ∈ Ai , ai = qi . Then
the opposition party can fight the government party’s proposal either by defending the
status quo qi , by defending the other alternative on the issue, or by devoting its efforts
to raising another issue j on which to propose a policy alternative a′j = q j , j = i .8
If, on the contrary, the government chooses waiting, the opposition can choose one
issue c on which to propose a policy alternative to the status-quo bc ∈ Ac, bc = qc.
Then the government party can either compete on the issue or raise a new issue k (with
b′k = qk, k = c).
3 The issue salience-policy agreement space
Issues are characterized by the distribution of the preferences of the electorate (Fxi , F
y
i ).
Alternatively, from Definitions 2 and 3, we can describe issues by their degree of







Figure 2 represents the issue salience and policy agreement space. We can identify
three different areas. First, the rectangleABEOcaptures all those issueswhich take rel-
atively low salience among voters’ pre-campaign concerns (σi < 1/2) thus implying
relatively high support for the status-quo policies on the issues (1− Fxi − Fyi > 1/2).
Given the high social consensus on the status-quo, it is unlikely that innovative policies
are electorally successful (their probability of defeating the status-quo is less than one
half) and parties will tend not to choose them in priority.
Second, the area BDE includes all those issues with relatively high salience (σi >
1/2), but relatively low agreement on an alternative policy to the status-quo. This
8 Proposing the same alternative ai or the status-quo on a different issue q j , j = i , are strictly dominated
strategies yielding zero probability of victory.
123
SERIEs (2012) 3:73–93 81























on the best 
alternative to 
the status-quo
Fig. 2 The set of feasible pairs of issue salience and policy agreement
area is defined by the line ζi = (1 − σi ) /σi which represents those issues whose
probability of defeating the status-quo is exactly 1/2 (that is, Fxi = 1/2). For those
issues below this line ζi < (1 − σi ) /σi , and any policy alternative has a probability
of victory against the status-quo less than 1/2.
Finally, the area BCD in the upper-right corner encompasses all those issues which
take relatively high salience (σi > 1/2) and on which there is relatively broad agree-
ment on the best policy alternative to the status-quo (ζi > (1 − σi ) /σi ). This area
corresponds to the set of likely successful issues.
Proposition 1 An issue i exhibits π xi > 1/2 if and only if σi > 1/2 and ζi >
(1 − σi ) /σi .
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
In the salience-agreement space of Fig. 2, we could draw a map of level curves
for different probabilities of defeating the status-quo.9 Each curve includes all the
combinations of issue saliencies and agreements on a policy alternative producing the
same probability to win the election. In Fig. 3 we have represented several of those
curves for the simple case where π xi = Fxi . The closer is the curve to the upper right
corner, the higher the probability that campaigning on any of the issues located on the
curve will defeat the status-quo. We will use this representation later in the paper to
discuss examples of the party’s choice of different issues in their electoral campaigns.
9 Formally, letting l(π¯ x ) be the set of issues whose favored alternative defeats the status-quo with proba-
bility π¯ x , we can write l(π¯ x ) = {(σi , ζi ) ∈ [0, 1]2 : ζi = (2ϕ−1i (π¯ x ) − σi )σi }, where, recall, ϕi (Fxi ) is
the probability that xi defeats qi when a fraction F
x
i of voters favor xi .
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Fig. 3 Issue alternatives with iso-probability of defeating the status-quo
4 Equilibrium results
We focus the analysis on subgame perfect equilibria, the standard concept in sequential
games with complete information. Such equilibria are characterized by:
1. the government choosing:
i) either taking the initiative or waiting,
ii) a policy alternative on one issue in case of taking the initiative,
iii) and a strategy in response to each possible policy alternative proposed by
the opposition;
and by
2. an opposition choosing:
i) a strategy in response to each policy alternative proposed by the government
in case the government takes the initiative, and
ii) a policy alternative on one issue to propose in case the incumbent govern-
ment does wait.
The strategies must be optimal responses in each subgame. Being a finite, zero-
sum game, a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists and parties have the same
probability of victory in all equilibria.
Following standard backward induction, we start by finding the optimal actions of
the players at each final decision node and continue working back to the beginning
of the game.
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4.1 Subgames w and nw
Let w and nw be the two proper subgames following the incumbent’s choice of tak-
ing the initiative or waiting (Their initial nodes are labeled as λnw and λw in Fig. 1.).
These two subgames are symmetric, and hence it suffices to analyze only one of them.
Denote the first mover of each subgame (G in nw and O in w) as player 1, and the
second mover as player 2. The following proposition and its corollary characterize the
best response correspondence for player 2.
Proposition 2 Let B R(xi ) be the set of best responses of player 2 to the proposal xi
by player 1. Then
1. qi ∈ B R(xi ) if and only if 1 − π xi ≥ maxk =i π xk .
2. x j ∈ B R(xi ) if and only if 1− π xi ≤ π xj , and (π xj − (1− π xi )) s ji ≥ (π xk − (1−
π xi ))ski for all k = i, j .
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
An implication of Proposition 2 is that the best response is independent of the pre-
campaign salience σi , and thus of the degree of social discontent with the status-quo
policy, whether the best response is defending the status quo or raising a new issue.
This result will also hold in the full game, as discussed below.
Corollary 1 Consider the policy proposal xi ∈ Ai .
1. If i > 1, then




qi , if π xi < 1 − π x1 ,
{qi , x1}, if π xi = 1 − π x1 ,
arg max
xk =xi
(xi , xk), if π xi > 1 − π x1 .
(4)





q1, if π x2 < 1 − π x1 ,
{q1, x2}, if π x2 = 1 − π x1 ,
arg max
xk =x1
(x1, xk), if π x2 > 1 − π x1 .
(5)
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
4.2 The full game
Consider the full game where the incumbent party may either take the initiative and
propose a policy alternative on some issue (and hence play the subgame nw), or hold
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to the current situation and wait for the challenger to propose some alternative (and
play subgame w).
As the following theorem shows, the equilibrium depends only on the two issues
with the highest probabilities of victory. Whether parties compete on the same issue or
raise different issues is independent of the pre-campaign issue salience, which reflects
voters’ concerns.
Theorem 1 Consider an agenda-setting political competition game.
1. If π x1 ≤ 1/2 or π x1 ≥ 1− π x1 > π x2 , then both parties compete on the same issue.
2. If π x1 > π
x
2 > 1 − π x1 , then parties focus on different issues.
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
The intuition is not difficult to grasp. If there is not a good (likely successful)
issue on which to propose a new policy alternative (π x1 ≤ 1/2), then, at equilibrium,
the government waits and, for each policy proposal of the challenger, it responds
by defending the status quo on that issue. If there is a single best-alternative which
is better than defending the status-quo and much better than any other alternative
(π x1 ≥ 1 − π x1 > π x2 ), then the government takes the initiative and proposes that
policy alternative, while the opposition is forced to defend the status-quo on the issue.
Finally, if there are promising policy alternatives on two issues (π x1 > π
x
2 > 1− π x1 ),
the two parties raise different issues.
Equilibrium results can be presented in terms of issue salience and agreement on
the policy alternative.
Theorem 2 Consider an agenda-setting electoral competition game in which parties
choose issues to be raised during the electoral campaign; σi is the degree of issue
salience and ζi is the degree of agreement on a policy alternative to the status quo on
issue i .
1. Let σ1 < 1/2, then both parties focus on the same issue. The degree of issue
salience is low (all the issues are within the rectangle ABEO in the Fig. 2). The
government defends the status-quo on any issue challenged by the opposition, and
the opposition chooses the best issue to challenge the status-quo. They may not
choose the most salient issue.
2. Let σ1 > 1/2, but ζ1 < (1 − σ1) σ1, then both parties focus on the same issue.
Some issue takes high salience among voters, but there is no broad agreement on
the best policy alternative to the status quo on the issue (all the issues are within
the set ABDO in Fig. 2, with some in BDE), the opposition chooses the issue on
which a policy alternative has the highest support, and the government defends
the status-quo. They may not choose the most salient issue.
3. Let σ1 > 1/2 and ζ1 > (1 − σ1) σ1, then the government chooses an issue with
high salience and broad policy agreement. If there exists another issue with suffi-
cient salience and agreement on the best policy alternative to the status-quo, the
opposition chooses that issue and parties focus on different issues. The most salient
issue may not be chosen. Otherwise the government proposes the best policy on
the most salient issue and the opposition defends the status-quo on that issue.
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
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The following results show that the incumbent government can benefit fromahigher
probability of winning and always chooses an issue with relatively high salience and
broad agreement (within the set BCD in Fig. 2), if there is any.
Corollary 2 Let ρ = maxi min j =i G(xi , x j ). The incumbent government wins with
probability max{ρ, 1 − ρ} > 1/2.
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
Proposition 3 Suppose there exists at least one issue i with σi > 1/2 and ζi >
(1 − σi ) /σi , then the issue chosen by the government at equilibrium exhibits both
high salience and broad policy agreement, σG > 1/2 and ζG > (1 − σG) /σG.
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
However, it is interesting to note that we cannot extend this latest result to the oppo-
sition, which may have to choose an issue with low salience or low level of agreement.
To see this, consider the following case.
Example Consider an election in which three potential issues have the following
distribution of support among the electorate:
(Fx1, F
y
1) = (0.7, 0.15); (Fx2, Fy2) = (0.51, 0.14); (Fx3, Fy3) = (0.49, 0.41),
which corresponds to the following salience and policy agreement values:
(σ1, ζ1) = (0.85, 0.647); (σ2, ζ2) = (0.65, 0.569); (σ3, ζ3) = (0.9, 0.089).
By Proposition 3 the government will not choose issue 2 because the degree of
policy agreement is low: ζ3 < (1 − σ3) /σ3 = 0.11. In fact, the incumbent govern-
ment will take the initiative and choose issue 1, which is more salient and has broader
agreement than issue 2. However, for the opposition to choose an issue, it is relevant
to see that on issue 2 there is broader policy agreement than on issue 3, but issue 2 is
much less salient. In this case, the trade-off is favorable to issue 3, in spite of having
low agreement. At equilibrium, the opposition does not choose issue 2, which has both
high salience and broad agreement, σ2 > 1/2 and ζ2 > (1 − σ2) /σ2 = 0.538, but
chooses x3 instead.10 Hence Proposition 3 does not apply to the opposition party.
Finally, observe that Proposition 3 also shows that the only situation in which we
can guarantee that the most salient issue is brought up during the electoral campaign is
when there is broad agreement on the best alternative in this issue and all other issues
show very low salience.
10 For all the examples we take π xi = Fxi and π yi = Fyi , and compute equilibria using Mathematica. The
program code can be obtained from the authors by request.
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Fig. 4 Example 1: Neither the most salient nor the most consensual issues are chosen
5 Examples
We provide two numerical examples that illustrate how the trade off between salience
and winning position shapes can induce parties competing in setting the electoral
agenda to overlook the concerns of the electorate, as represented by issue salience, by
choosing either to defend an unpopular status-quo on the issue or not talking about it
at all.
5.1 Example 1: Neither the most salient issue nor the most consensual issues are
chosen
Consider an election with four potential issues whose distribution of support among
the electorate is represented by
(Fx1, F
y
1) = (0.65, 0.00); (Fx2, Fy2) = (0.63, 0.25);
(Fx3, F
y
3) = (0.61, 0.30); (Fx4, Fy4) = (0.51, 0.48),
which corresponds to the following salience and policy agreement values:
(σ1, ζ1) = (0.65, 1.00); (σ2, ζ2) = (0.88, 0.432);
(σ3, ζ3) = (0.91, 0.34); (σ4, ζ4) = (0.99, 0.03),
as represented in Fig. 4.
In equilibrium, government and opposition focus on different issues, 2 and 3 respec-
tively. Specifically, the government takes the initiative and announces x2 and the oppo-
sition responds by choosing x3. Both parties overlook issue 4, which is themost salient
issue (99% of the electorate want to change the status-quo), and issue 1, which is the
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Fig. 5 Example 2: Parties may focus on the least salient issue
one with highest agreement (everybody in favor of changing the status-quo agrees on
the alternative policy). Nevertheless, they focus on issues with either higher levels of
agreement than issue 4 or more salience than issue 1.
5.2 Example 2: Parties may focus on the least salient issue
Consider an election in which three potential issues have the following distribution of
support among the electorate
(Fx1, F
y
1) = (0.51, 0.01); (Fx2, Fy2) = (0.44, 0.40); (Fx3, Fy3) = (0.40, 0.39),
which corresponds to the following salience and policy agreement values:
(σ1, ζ1) = (0.52, 0.96); (σ2, ζ2) = (0.84, 0.048); (σ3, ζ3) = (0.79, 0.012),
as represented in Fig. 5.
The government chooses issue 1, the only one in BCD (recall Proposition 3). The
opposition does not choose issues 2 or 3 for lack of agreement on the best policy on
those issues, but it rather challenges the government on the same issue 1. The electoral
campaign focuses on the least salient issue.
In this case, the opposition does not challenge the highly unsatisfactory status-quo
policies on issues 2 and 3 (with around 80% of electorate in favor of changing the
status-quo) as they lack voters’ agreement on the best alternative. Hence, if salient
issues lack enough voters’ agreement on the best alternative, the government and the
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opposition may ignore voters’ concern and focus their electoral campaign on less
salient issues (even the least salient one).
These are just specific examples to show possible occurrences. To approach more
general results, we can note that parties will never choose the issue with both the
lowest salience and the highest controversy or lowest agreement on the appropriate
policy alternative. But regarding highly salient issues, if there is not sufficiently broad
agreement on a policy alternative, the opposition party may choose not to challenge
a highly unsatisfactory status-quo policy and the incumbent government may survive
in spite of its bad policy performance.
6 Illustration
Some features of the model could be illustrated with cases from the real world if the
basic variables—pre-campaign issue salience in voters’ concerns and agreement in
favor of one of the policy alternatives on each issue—could be operationalized with
data from survey polls and electoral campaigns. Just as an informal example to show
the analytical potential of the model let us take the United States presidential election
in 2004.11
This case seems sufficiently close to our assumptions regarding a two party compe-
tition for a single office by plurality rule. Several survey polls asked voters to identify
the most important issues in the 2004 U.S. presidential election. Observers broadly
coincide in identifying ‘moral values’, ‘the economy’, ‘terrorism’, and ‘the Iraq war’,
in this order, followed by others with minor impact such as ‘health care’, ‘taxes’, and
‘education’. Broad agreementwas obtained in favor of the alternatives promoted by the
Republicans on ‘terrorism’, ‘moral values’ and ‘taxes’, in this order, and in favor of the
alternatives promoted by the Democrats on ‘the economy’, ‘health care’, ‘education’,
and ‘the Iraq war’, also in this order [see National Election Pool (2004), Stroud and
Kenski (2007), as well as similar operazionalizations for previous elections by RePass
(1971), McCombs and Zhu (1995), Burden and Sanberg (2003), and discussion by
Wlezien (2005)].
Regarding the actual choice of issues during the electoral campaign by the two
major candidates, Republican GeorgeW. Bush and Democrat John Kerry, there is also
high coincidence in the academic literature. On the basis of people’s responses to the
‘most important issue’ question, Weisberg (2005) conjectured that “people who sup-
ported Bush naturally would have chosen terrorism as their top concern. Kerry argued
that the Iraq war was a diversion from the fight against Al Qaeda, so his supporters
would likely have chosen Iraq as their first concern.” (p. 784). While indeed Demo-
cratic activists and opinion-makers pressured in favor of Kerry campaigning mainly
about ‘Iraq’ in response toBush’s emphasis on ‘terrorism’, polls show thatmost people
agreed with the statement that the Iraq war was part of the war on terrorism (Norpoth
and Sidman 2007 as observed by).
11 A complete and rigorous analysis of this event is beyond the scope of the paper as it would require,
among other things, studying issue ownership, campaign resources, valence issues, etc.
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However, while Bush indeed chose ‘terrorism’ as the first issue, Kerry did not focus
on ‘Iraq’, but on ‘the economy’. “George W. Bush ran for re-election as a war-time
president, emphasizing the importance of staying the course on the ‘War onTerrorism’.
At the same time, the economy had not fully recovered from the recession, and the
job picture remained lackluster; his opponent, John Kerry, stressed the economy and
other domestic issues such as health care” (Weisberg 2005, p. 777; see also Weisberg
and Christenson 2007).
Other empirical analyses confirm the basic traits just remarked. According to
Abramson et al. (2005), vote decisions were based largely upon retrospective evalu-
ation of Bush as a successful president and as a leader who would be successful in
combating terrorism, while moral values and social issues had low importance. In a
close analysis, it is noted that as the threat of terrorism remained a substantial con-
cern through election day and afforded Bush an overwhelming advantage, although
the state of the economy and the war in Iraq were viewed negatively by most voters
(Abramson et al. 2005). In another stance by Campbell (2005), it is remarked that the
influence of the campaign was affected bymajor concerns that Kerry would not handle
the war on terrorism as well as Bush, while there were more divided views about the
economy and Iraq.
We can observe that none of the candidates chose to campaign in priority for the
issue which could have higher pre-campaign salience among voters, ‘moral values’.
Numerous observers noted that, in spite of pundits’ comments, ‘moral values’ ranked
low in the issues list predicting actual voters’ choices at the end of the electoral cam-
paign (Langer and Cohen 2005, for instance). Republican candidate George W. Bush,
instead of choosing this issue, on which he obtained relatively high support and advan-
tage regarding the other candidate, chose the one in which his policy had the highest
support, even if it was considered less important by the voters, ‘terrorism’. Democratic
candidate John Kerry did not choose in priority the issue ‘Iraq’, which, as mentioned,
would have been a direct response to the initiative in favor of ‘terrorism’ taken byBush,
apparently for lack of agreement on the best alternative policy. He instead chose the
issue inwhich he could obtain the highest agreement, ‘economy/jobs’. Both candidates
gave, thus, priority to those issues in which they could expect more popular agreement
with their policy alternatives among the voters and higher advantage regarding the
other candidate, rather than those which were more salient in voters’ concerns.
7 Conclusion
We have presented an agenda-setting model of electoral competition in which parties
choose to give salience and campaign on those issues onwhich they expect their policy
proposals will obtain voters’ broad support.
Parties have to trade off the pre-campaign salience of each issue in voters’ concerns
and the voters’ support or agreement in favor of the policy alternatives on the issue.We
have found that, although parties will not compete on irrelevant issues (those with both
low salience among voters and divisive policy proposals), indeed the issues which are
considered the most important ones by a majority of votes may not be given salience
during the electoral campaign.
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As we noted at the beginning, this may be surprising, but not unreasonable after all.
Even if there is extensive public concern on some issue, if there is not a single policy
proposal on the issue which can attract broad agreement, focusing on that issue might
produce high division and polarization among both parties and voters.
In the short term, mediocre policies broadly rejected by the electorate, as well as
incumbent parties with no good performance in government, may survive for lack of a
sufficiently convincing alternative. Since parties tend to choose to campaign on issues
on the basis of relatively popular policies, in the long term broad policy consensus can
be accumulated on an increasing number of issues. But since parties do not always
choose to campaign on the issues with the highest pre-electoral salience, the political
agenda may successively select, address and settle policy issues in an order which
may not correspond to their importance in voters’ concerns.
Appendix: Proofs
A Proof of Proposition 1
Becauseπ xi = ϕ(Fxi )with ϕ′ > 0 and ϕ(1/2) = 1/2, it suffices to show thatFxi > 1/2
if and only if σi > 1/2 and ζi > (1 − σi ) σi .
1. Let F xi > 1/2. Then σi > 1/2 (Definition 2). Because ζi is increasing in F
x
i , then
ζi > (1 − σi )σi , where we have substituted F xi = 1/2 in (3).
2. Let σi > 1/2. From (3), we can obtain F xi = σi (1 + ζi )/2. Hence, F xi > 1/2
if and only ζi > (1 − σi )σi . Therefore, if σi > 1/2 and ζi > (1 − σi )σi , then
F xi > 1/2. unionsq
B Proof of Proposition 2
1. We know that qi ∈ B R(xi ) if an only if 2(qi , xi ) ≥ 2(xk, xi ) for all k = i .
That is, if and only if 1 − π xi ≥ ski π xk + (1 − ski ) (1 − π xi ) for all j = k.
Since ski ∈ (0, 1), the inequality holds if and only if 1−π xi ≥ π xk ,∀k = i , which
is equivalent to the condition in the statement: 1 − π xi ≥ maxk =i π xk .
2. Similarly, x j ∈ B R(xi ) if and only if it is better than choosing the status-quo in
i (2(x j , xi ) ≥ 2(qi , xi )) and better than choosing a policy alternative in
another issue k = i, j (2(x j , xi ) ≥ 2(xk, xi )). The first condition is equivalent
to s ji π xj +(1−s ji )(1−π xi ) ≥ 1−π xi , that is, π xj ≥ 1−π xi . The second condition
implies that for all k = i, j, s ji π xj +(1−s ji )(1−π xi ) ≥ ski π xk +(1−ski )(1−π xi ).
Simplifying, (π xj − (1 − π xi ))s ji ≥ (π xk − (1 − π xi ))ski . unionsq
C Proof of Corollary 1




i for all i > 2. Observe that
(x j , xi ) = s jiπ xj + (1 − s ji )(1 − π xi ) = (1 − π xi ) + s ji (π xj − (1 − π xi )).
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Hence, maximizing (x j , xi ) with respect to x j for a given xi is equivalent to maxi-
mizing s ji (π xj −(1−π xi )), namely, the expression in part 2 of Proposition 2. Therefore,
the results follow directly from Proposition 2. unionsq
D Proof of Theorem 1
We proceed case by case.
1. Let π x1 ≤ 1/2. Then π xi < π x1 ≤ 1/2 ≤ 1 − π x1 ∀i > 1. It follows from
Corollary 1 that B R(xk) = qk for all issue k, implying that both parties compete
on the same issue.
2. Let π x1 ≥ 1 − π x1 > π x2 . Then 1 − π x1 > π xi for all i > 1. From Corollary 1,
B R(xi ) = qi for all i , and hence both parties compete on the same issue.
3. Let π x1 > π
x
2 > 1 − π x1 . Let (a∗1 , a∗2 ) be the policy alternatives of an equi-
librium outcome. We only need to show that a∗2 = xi for some i and hence
parties give political salience to different issues. Suppose that, on the contrary,
a∗2 = qk for some k. Then (a∗1 , a∗2 ) = (xk, qk) and player 1 wins with prob-
ability (xk, qk) = π xk . From Corollary 1, it must be that π xk ≤ 1 − π x1 . By
definition, (x1, B R(x1)) = min
i>1
{s1iπ x1 + (1 − s1i )(1 − π xi )} > 1 − π x1 , since
π x1 > 1 − π xi ≥ 1 − π x1 . But then (x1, B R(x1)) > 1 − π x1 ≥ π xk , and so
x1 is a better choice than xk for player 1, a contradiction with (xk, qk) being the
equilibrium policies. Therefore, it cannot be that a∗2 = qk and parties must give
political salience to different issues. unionsq
E Proof of Theorem 2
1. Let σ1 < 1/2, then π x1 < 1/2 (Proposition 1). FromTheorem 1, both parties focus
on the same issue. At the subgame s (s = w, nw) player 2 always responds by
defending the status-quo. Hence player 1 chooses issue 1, the one with the highest
probability of victory, and player 2 defends the status-quoqi against any alternative
xi . Player 1 wins with probability π x1 .When deciding whether to take the initiative
or wait, the government compares G(w) = 1 − π x1 ≥ π x1 = G(nw) and
chooses to wait, where (abusing notation) G(s) represents the incumbent gov-
ernment’s expected probability of victory associated to any Nash Equilibrium of
the subgame s . Therefore, at the equilibrium path of the full game the opposition
chooses x1 while the incumbent government defends the status-quo in all issues.
Consider the following example with issues (F x1 , F
y
1 ) = (0.3, 0.1), (F x2 , F y2 ) =
(0.25, 0.2) and F xi < F
x







all i > 2 since π xj < 1/2 if and only if F
x
j < 1/2. Hence, since both parties focus
on issue 1 at equilibrium and σ2 = 0.42 > 0.4 = σ1, they do not choose the most
salient issue.
2. Let σ1 > 1/2 and ζ1 < (1 − σ1)/σ1. From Proposition 1, π x1 < 1/2. Theorem 1
implies that both parties focus on the same issue. An argument similar to the
one used in the previous case shows that the opposition chooses issue 1 and the
government waits and defends the status-quo. Consider the following example.
(F x1 , F
y
1 ) = (0.4, 0.2), (F x2 , F y2 ) = (0.35, 0.3) and F xi < F x2 for all i > 2.
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Observe that σ2 = 0.65> 0.6= σ1 > 1/2 and ζ1 = 0.33< 0, 66= (1−σi )/(σi ).
Hence, both parties choose issue 1, while issue 2 shows higher salience (although
lower level of policy agreement).
3. Let σ1 > 1/2 and ζ1 > 1/2. From Proposition 1, π x1 > 1/2. By Theorem 1, if
π x2 > 1−π x1 they focus on different issues, otherwise they choose the same issue.
Let k = ϕ−1(1−π x1 ), that is the electoral support that an alternative x would need
to defeat the status-quo with probability 1 − π x1 . Then, π x2 > 1 − π x1 if and only
if Fx2 > k. The inequality F
x
2 > k holds if and only if σ2 > k and σ2(1+ ζ2) > k.
Therefore, if there exists another issue with enough salience and policy agreement
(namely σ2 > k and ζ2 > (2k −σ2)/σ2 where k = ϕ−1(1−π x1 )) parties focus on
different issues, otherwise they both compete on the same issue. As the examples
in Sects. 5.1 and 5.2 show, they may not choose the most salient, nor focus on
issue 1 and 2. unionsq
F Proof of Corollary 2
We know that ρ = maxi min j 1(xi , x j ) and (1−ρ) are the values of the games nw
and w, respectively, and that the incumbent government can choose the subgame
to play by waiting or taking the initiative. Therefore, the government will choose
the subgame with the highest value and hence its probability of winning will be
max{ρ, 1 − ρ} ≥ 1/2. unionsq
G Proof of Proposition 3
1. By Proposition 1, we only need to show that if the incumbent government chooses
an issue G, then π xG > 1/2. Assume that there exists an issue i such that σi > 1/2
and ζi > 1/2. Then, π xi > 1/2 and hence π
x
1 > 1/2, as π
x
1 ≥ π xi for all i .
2. Suppose that π xG < 1/2.
(a) Then π x2 > 1− π x1 , otherwise the government could choose issue 1 at equi-
librium and obtain ∗G = π x1 > 1/2.
(b) Because π x2 > 1 − π x1 we know by Theorem 1 that parties choose different
issues and, by Corollary 2, ∗G > 1/2 > ∗O .
(c) Moreover, it must be that π xO < 1/2. Otherwise 
∗
G = sG O π xG + (1 −
sG O) (1 − π xO) < 1/2, a contradiction with the previous step.
(d) If the government does not wait (nw), it must be that ∗O ≥ siG π xi + (1−
siG) (1− π xG) for all i = G. Since ∗O < 1/2 and 1− π xG ≥ 1/2, it follows
that π xi ≤ 1/2 for all i = G. But this is a contradiction with the initial
assumption that π x1 > 1/2.
(e) If the government waited at equilibrium, the opposition could always choose
issue 1 and guarantee a probability of victory of at least = mini =1 si1 π x1 +
(1− si1) (1−π xi ) ≤ ∗O . Because ∗O < 1/2 and π x1 > 1/2, it follows that
π xi ≥ 1/2 for all i . But this is a contradiction with the government choosing
an issue with π xG < 1/2.
Therefore we have proved that at equilibrium π xG > 1/2. It follows from Proposition 1
that σG > 1/2 and that ζG > 1/2. unionsq
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